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WHEN WILL ECONOMICS GUIDE IMF AND
WORLD BANK REFORMS?
Charles W. Calomiris
The “Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory
Commission” (IFIAC 2000), released in March, is a blueprint for
reforming the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and
other multilateral development banks. That report, known as the
“Meltzer Commission Report” (Allan H. Meltzer was chairman of the
IFIAC), was signed by a bipartisan majority of 8 to 3. It has generated
its share of criticism from opponents in the commission minority, the
Clinton administration, labor unions, and Congress.1
Since our report was published, it has become clear to me that two
separate debates are being waged over the new “global financial ar-
chitecture.” One is the narrow (visible) debate over the technical
aspects of specific proposals for designing mechanisms to achieve
well-defined economic objectives. The other is a broader (less visible)
debate over whether the IMF, the World Bank, and the other devel-
opment banks should have narrowly defined economic objectives or
alternatively, be used as tools of ad hoc diplomacy. Until we settle that
second, broader political debate, we cannot seriously even begin the
constructive dialogue over how best to achieve economic objectives.
That dialogue is important; our proposals are a starting point for
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rebuilding these institutions, not the final word. But those who op-
pose the basic premises of the Meltzer Report do not want to get to
that constructive phase. They want the reformers to just go away.
Although open opposition to the Meltzer Report generally focuses on
its details, behind closed doors critics are candid about their primary
reason for objecting to our proposals: “Forget economics; it’s the
foreign policy, stupid.” For proposed reforms to succeed, then, they
must face the challenges posed not only by economic logic, but by the
political economy of foreign policy.
In this article, I summarize the recommendations of the commis-
sion and respond to criticisms of our recommendations, both from the
standpoint of their economic logic and their political economy. I
argue not only that the commission’s recommendations make sense as
economics, but defend the principles on which they are based, spe-
cifically, the premise that the World Bank and the IMF should not
and cannot continue to serve the ad hoc political purposes of broad
foreign policy.
First Principles
The Meltzer Report begins with a well-defined set of economic
objectives and political principles, and suggests mechanisms that
would accomplish those objectives within the confines of those prin-
ciples. The economic objectives for the multilateral financial institu-
tions include: (1) improving global capital market liquidity; (2) alle-
viating poverty in the poorest countries; (3) promoting effective in-
stitutional reforms in the legal and financial systems of developing
countries that spur development; (4) providing effective global public
goods, e.g., through programs to deal with global problems of public
health (particularly, malaria and AIDS) and environmental risks in
developing countries; and (5) collecting and disseminating valuable
economic data in a uniform and timely manner. The commission
viewed liquidity provision during crises, macroeconomic advisory ser-
vices, and data collection and dissemination to be appropriate mis-
sions of the IMF, and saw poverty alleviation, the promotion of re-
form, the provision of global public goods, microeconomic data col-
lection and dissemination, and related advisory services as the central
missions of the development banks.
We identified six principles that any credible reform strategy
should satisfy, and which underlie our proposals: (1) respecting mem-
ber countries’ sovereignty (that is, the desire to minimize the intru-
siveness of membership requirements or conditions for receiving as-
sistance); (2) clearly separating tasks across institutions (to avoid waste
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and counterproductive overlap, and to enhance accountability); (3)
setting credible boundaries on goals and discretionary actions (to
prevent undesirable mission creep and to promote accountability); (4)
judging policies not by their stated objectives but by their effective-
ness (i.e., ensuring that the mechanisms chosen to channel assistance
are likely to succeed and to avoid waste); (5) ensuring accountability
of management through clear disclosure, accounting, internal gover-
nance rules, and independent evaluation of performance; and (6)
sharing the financial burden of aid fairly among benefactor countries.
The Record of IMF and Development Banks Performance
We began by evaluating the performance of the IMF, the World
Bank, and the other development banks against the touchstone of
these goals and principles and found these institutions quite deficient.
They often failed to achieve their goals, even by their own internal
measures. Studies of the extent to which the IMF succeeds in en-
forcing its lending conditions show a poor track record. Sebastian
Edwards (1989) found that most of the time IMF lending conditions
are not met. And all three comprehensive studies of the average
effects of IMF programs, which include the IMF’s own study, failed
to find evidence of a positive effect on economic activity or domestic
securities prices from having received IMF assistance (Brealy and
Kaplanis 1999, Ul Haque and Khan 1999, Bordo and Schwartz 1999).
Why is the IMF so ineffective? For one thing, the IMF’s crisis
lending mechanism is not designed to fulfill the role of providing
effective liquidity assistance. Liquidity crises happen quickly. There is
no time to enter into protracted negotiations, or to demonstrate that
one is an innocent victim of external shocks (as the IMF’s stillborn
contingent credit facility mandates). If the IMF is to focus on liquidity
assistance, and if liquidity assistance is to be effective, there is no
viable alternative to having countries prequalify for lines of credit.
The testimony before our commission of the IMF’s acting managing
director, Stanley Fischer, recognized the desirability of prequalifica-
tion for providing liquidity assistance (Fisher 2000). The current IMF
formula of taking weeks or months to negotiate terms and conditions
for liquidity assistance, and then offering that assistance in stages over
a long period of time, simply is a non-starter if the goal is to mitigate
or prevent liquidity crises.
IMF and development bank lending—which entails substantial
subsidies to borrowing countries—does, however, manage to transfer
resources to debtor countries during severe economic crises. But
those transfers do not seem to improve securities markets or spur
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growth; rather, they are put to use for less laudable goals—most
notoriously, for shady transactions in Russia or the Ukraine. But it is
the so-called legitimate uses of IMF and development bank emer-
gency loan subsidies that are even more troubling, especially their use
in facilitating the bailouts of insolvent domestic banks and firms and
international lenders, which ultimately are financed mainly by taxes
on domestic residents.
In the cases of Mexico, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, those tax
bills ranged from 20 percent to 55 percent of annual GDP, and
averaged more than 30 percent of GDP. Not only do these bailouts
transfer enormous wealth from average citizens to rich cronies, they
undermine market discipline (by softening the penalties for unwise
investing) and encourage reckless lending domestically and interna-
tionally. They also strengthen the hold that domestic cronies continue
to exert on their countries’ political systems.
Consider the current IMF program being established with Ecua-
dor. Ecuador has been suffering a deepening fiscal crisis for several
years caused by the combination of an unresolved internal political
struggle, adverse economic shocks to its terms of trade, and a poorly
regulated banking system (which encouraged enormous risk taking at
taxpayers expense, and which has imposed a bailout cost of 40 percent
of annual GDP on taxpayers). As yet, there is no consensus for reform
in Ecuador, and there is no reason to believe that reforms will be
produced by a few hundreds of millions of IMF dollars. Why in the
world is the IMF sending money to Ecuador? Some observers claim
that IMF aid to Ecuador is best understood as a means of sending
political payola to the Ecuadoran government at a time when the
United States wishes to ensure continuing use of its military bases
there monitoring drug traffic. Will that sort of IMF policy be likely to
produce the needed long-run reforms in fiscal and bank regulatory
policy? Has the IMF not learned anything from the failure of its
lending to Russia in 1997–98?
Argentina, perhaps more than any other country, has depended on
IMF conditional lending over the past several years to maintain its
access to international markets. It is now perceived by some as po-
tentially at risk of a public finance meltdown, which many commen-
tators blame, in part, on the IMF and U.S. Treasury. IMF support, in
retrospect, was counterproductive because it put the cart of cash
ahead of the horse of reform. Now Argentina is faced with a growing,
and possibly an unsustainable, debt service burden. Furthermore, at
the IMF’s behest, Argentina substantially raised its tax rates last year,
choking off its nascent recovery. Instead, Argentina should have cut
government expenditures. The notion that tax hikes are an effective
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substitute for expenditure cuts as a means of successful fiscal reform
is an article of faith at the IMF, but unfortunately, one that is at odds
with the evidence. The chronology of policy failure in Argentina is
aptly summarized in a recent financial markets newsletter:
Between 1996 and 1999, the IMF and IDB all but led the market-
ing effort for Argentine bonds. The two institutions voiced strong
endorsements each time that there was a confidence crisis in Ar-
gentina. The IDB went so far as to dispatch its most senior econ-
omist to New York last summer to recommend that U.S. portfolio
managers buy Argentine bonds. At the same time, the Street came
to realize that the U.S. Treasury was the real force behind the IMF
and IDB support for Argentina. It was never clear why there was
such unwavering support. The motivation could have been geo-
political. Argentina was a staunch supporter of U.S. political policies
around the world and across the region. Argentina was also the
poster-child of the so-called Washington Consensus.
. . . Therefore, the U.S. needed Argentina to succeed. At the
beginning of the year, when the Machinea team traveled to Wash-
ington to seek a revised Standby Facility, the team met first with the
U.S. Treasury before meeting with the IMF and the World Bank.
These actions sent clear signals to the market that the country had
an implicit guarantee from Washington. Otherwise, it would have
been irrational for any creditor to lend so much money to such a
leveraged country with such little flexibility [BCP’s Molano Latin
American Daily 2000].2
How Argentina will extricate itself from its current debt trap is
unclear. What is clear, however, is that the U.S. Treasury/IMF-
sponsored debt inflows and tax hikes of the past several years put
Argentina into this risky position. More market discipline, less U.S.
Treasury/IMF “assistance,” and less debt, at an earlier date would
have encouraged the needed reforms of government expenditures
and labor market regulations.
The World Bank’s record and the records of the regional develop-
ment banks in sponsoring successful programs are also poor. The
World Bank’s internal evaluations of performance (which are made
shortly after the last disbursement of funds) identify more than half of
its projects as failing to achieve “satisfactory, sustainable” results. The
World Bank earmarks subsidized loans to member countries, but does
2Similarly, an earlier article quoted a market newsletter of December 1997: “Add in the
clear moral hazard caused by the IMF bail-outs [in Asia]—two investors last week told me
that they were planning to put on large Brazilian positions (even though they were very
unhappy with the currency regime) because they were convinced that a Brazilian crisis
would result in an immediate IMF bail-out—and it is hard to see why fundamentals should
matter.” See Calomiris and Meltzer (1999: 90.)
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little to ensure that the funds are used for the stated purposes. And
the allocation of funds is primarily to countries with easy access to
private capital markets. Over the past decade, the World Bank has
lent 70 percent of its funds to 11 countries. These countries are not
among the poorest or those lacking access to markets. Indeed, for
those 11 countries, development bank loans average less than 2 per-
cent of total capital inflows during that period.
The commission found that development banks were ineffective as
promoters of reform. As shown in the work of David Dollar and
others at the World Bank, programs that subsidize institution building
only work in countries that already have a commitment to reform
(World Bank 1998). Reform-minded governments offer windows of
opportunity for change, and under those circumstances constructive
reforms can be hastened and broadened by appropriate external as-
sistance, which can benefit not only the recipient but other countries
as well (including the United States). But to be effective, subsidies
have to reward bona fide efforts, not just lip service. There is a need
to improve dramatically the way reform subsidization is delivered to
ensure that it is channeled effectively where it can have the greatest
positive impact.
The Meltzer Commission also found that the development banks
are devoting far too little to alleviating global problems in the areas of
public health, particularly the endemic problems of AIDS and ma-
laria, which are important stumbling blocks to economic development
in many of the poorest countries.
None of the international financial institutions clearly defines and
limits its spheres of activity. The IMF’s mission warrants short-term
lending, yet the IMF typically makes long-term loans. Sixty-nine
countries have borrowed from the IMF for a total of more than 20
years, and 24 of those countries have borrowed for more than 30
years. Seventy-three countries have borrowed from the IMF in more
than 90 percent of the years they have been members of the IMF
(Vasquez 2000). The development banks participate in short-term
emergency lending, despite the fact that this is not consistent with
their long-term focus on development, and even though their man-
agements sometimes privately complain about having to do so.
There is little disclosure of relevant information about accounting
or decision making. In the case of the IMF, its own staff admits that
its accounting system is an exercise in obfuscation:
The cumulative weight of the Fund’s jerry-built structure of finan-
cial provisions has meant that almost nobody outside, and, indeed,
few inside, the Fund understand how the organization works, be-
cause relatively simple economic relations are buried under increas-
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ingly opaque layers of language. To cite one example, the Fund
must be the only financial organization in the world for which the
balance sheet . . . contains no information whatever on the magni-
tudes of its outstanding credits or its liquid liabilities. More seri-
ously, the Fund’s outdated financial structure has been a handicap
in its financial operations [Polak 1999: 2].
With regard to the principle of respecting sovereignty, critics of all
political persuasions seem to agree that the international institutions
should reduce their intrusiveness. Labor union officials complain that
conditions for assistance requiring labor market “flexibility” under-
mine the position of trade unions. Martin Feldstein (1998) has faulted
the IMF for undermining debtor countries sovereignty through ex-
cessive micromanagement of the conditions attached to subsidized
loans. George Schultz and others complain that the sovereignty and
constitutional frameworks of creditor members are also undermined,
since loan subsidies often serve as an end-around the legislative over-
sight that should accompany foreign aid.
Proposals for Reform
The Meltzer Commission’s recommendations for reform follow
directly from the perceived gap between actual performance of these
institutions and the combination of bona fide objectives and prin-
ciples that we viewed as noncontroversial. With respect to the IMF,
the commission unanimously voted to end long-term lending. The 8-3
majority went further, recommending that the IMF focus on main-
taining liquidity for emerging economies. By providing lines of credit
to countries that meet minimal pre-established standards, and lending
to them as a senior creditor at a penalty rate, the IMF could prevent
avoidable liquidity crises without sponsoring counterproductive bail-
outs of banks at taxpayers’ expense.
The terms under which the IMF would lend are crucial to our
reform proposal. Under current practice the IMF lends at a markup
over its cost of funds. That is not a penalty rate—for many countries
it implies a substantial subsidy. Our proposed penalty rate removes
that subsidy. Countries facing a bona fide liquidity crisis (including
those with past fiscal problems that have decided to improve their
fiscal discipline) would benefit by borrowing short-term at a penalty
rate, since such borrowing would allow them to avoid unnecessary
collapse. But countries seeking financial assistance for bailouts would
get no benefit from senior IMF lending at a penalty rate. Countries
facing both a liquidity crisis and a banking crisis would still likely
access IMF lending, but doing so would discourage fiscally costly
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bailouts of banks. Borrowing on senior terms from the IMF at a
penalty rate would not channel subsidies to a country that chose to
expand its public deficit by bailing out its banks; indeed, it would
hamper that country’s ability to raise and retain private funds. Thus
IMF complicity in bailouts would be avoided.
The proposed prequalification requirements for IMF lending are
few. They include meeting IMF fiscal standards and prudential bank-
ing standards (that is, requiring that banks maintain adequate capital
and liquid reserves). IMF discretion would be relied upon in setting
and enforcing prequalification standards. Those standards reduce the
likelihood that borrowing countries would access IMF lending to
sponsor bailouts at their taxpayers’ expense. We also recommend
requiring that countries with access to IMF credit be required to
permit free entry into their financial systems by foreign financial
institutions. That requirement would go a long way toward ensuring
competitive, stable banking in emerging markets, and in so doing
would substantially reduce the likelihood and magnitude of bank
bailouts. More than 50 countries already have agreed to this World
Trade Organization (WTO) provision. Over the five years that we
envision for the transition to this new pre-qualification system virtu-
ally all emerging market countries would be able to meet these stan-
dards.
Our prequalification requirements are designed to avoid, rather
than increase, intrusion by the IMF into the sovereignty of borrowing
countries. IMF conditionality now is ex post, customized microman-
agement (which is necessarily very intrusive). We suggest, instead,
making IMF liquidity assistance available based on clearly specified
rules which are the same for all countries. The requirement that
countries allow free entry into financial services is not designed to
force countries into greater free trade, per se, but to protect borrow-
ing countries’ citizens from bearing the costs of IMF-sponsored bail-
outs. The IMF’s complicity in the bank bailouts in Mexico, Asia, and
elsewhere—which the prequalification standards and penalty rate
would avoid—has been a far more important invasion of sovereignty
than our prequalification standards would be.
What would happen if the stability of the global financial system
were at stake because a large developing country in need of liquidity
assistance had not prequalified? The report recognizes that the
prequalification requirement could be waived in such a circumstance,
but the lending limits, the IMF’s senior status, the short maturity, and
the penalty rate would still apply.
With respect to the development banks, for poverty alleviation, we
recommended relying on grants to service providers with indepen-
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dent verification of performance, rather than loans earmarked to gov-
ernments, as a mechanism more likely to deliver results. Develop-
ment banks would share the burden of financing projects with recipi-
ent governments. For the poorest countries, the development banks
would pay nearly all cost, but for those with higher per capita income
the share of development bank support could be much lower. Grants
would be paid to service providers, not governments, and those pro-
viders would compete for projects in open auctions. No grants would
be paid out by development banks unless independent auditors had
verified that the providers had actually achieved the stated objectives.
With respect to promoting institutional reform, the commission
proposed making loans to governments at highly subsidized rates, but
only after they had passed laws establishing reforms. The maturity of
those loans would be extended (and thus the subsidies increased)
conditional on the continuation of reforms—that is, only if indepen-
dent verification indicates that promised reforms are continuing on
track. For example, if a country passed a bankruptcy reform law, it
would be eligible for a subsidized loan in support of implementing
that new law (which can be a protracted and difficult process). Con-
tinuing progress after the law was passed (as indicated, for example,
by an independent international group that rates the performance of
countries’ bankruptcy systems) would be a prerequisite to extending
the duration of the loan.
We recommend focusing country-level poverty assistance and re-
form subsidies on the poorest countries, where it is needed most (a
distinct departure from current practice). And we suggest devolving
much of the authority over country-specific programs that combat
poverty or support institutional reforms to regional development
banks, leaving the World Bank to pursue neglected global public
goods provision, for example, in the areas of health and the environ-
ment.
Are the existing resources of the international financial institutions
adequate to meet these objectives? Yes and no. If the IMF refocused
its efforts on emergency liquidity assistance, offered at a penalty rate,
it could provide substantial benefits at little cost. So the IMF’s capital
is more than adequate. The resources currently available to the de-
velopment banks could provide substantially greater and more effec-
tive assistance if the commission’s recommendations were adopted.
However, the Meltzer Commission recommended substantial new
appropriations for these institutions, if they can be reformed to im-
prove their effectiveness.
The commission also voted unanimously that the IMF and the
development banks should write off all claims against the highly in-
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debted poor countries (HIPCs) once those countries have established
credible development programs. The financial distress of the HIPCs
is as much an indictment of multilateral lenders (and the governments
that control them) as it is of the leaders in the borrowing countries
who often wasted those funds or used them for personal gain, leaving
their impoverished citizens with an enormous debt burden. If the
multilateral lenders can reform their policies so as not to produce
these debt burdens again in the future, and if the HIPCs can establish
the basic foundations for growth, there is little point to continuing to
punish the citizens in these countries for the mistakes of the policy-
makers of the past. However, without substantial reforms of the in-
ternational financial institutions, debt relief will accomplish little in the
long run; without reform, debt forgiveness would be a prelude to re-
building the mountain of unpayable debt that now faces HIPC countries.
Reactions to the Report
The editorial pages of the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
and the Financial Times have been favorably disposed to some or all
of our recommendations, which has helped us to get a fair hearing.
Some G7 officials outside the United States (notably officials in Ger-
many, the U.K., Canada, and the ECB) have expressed strong support
for the thrust of our recommendations on IMF reform. The IMF, the
U.S. Treasury, and the World Bank have each agreed with some of
our criticisms and recommendations, and some of the reforms they
are currently implementing move slightly in the directions we suggest
(or at least appear to do so). Specifically, the IMF claims that it will
improve its contingent credit line facility to attract more countries to
sign on to it, and the Treasury Secretary has called for a scaling down
of long-term IMF lending (although neither the IMF nor the Trea-
sury has accepted the need to focus the IMF primarily or exclusively
on liquidity assistance, as opposed to emergency aid broadly defined).
While the World Bank has rejected our grant-based approach for
providing assistance, and our call for HIPC debt forgiveness, in at
least one recent case they seem to have accepted the essence of our
argument for grant-based support. In late April, when considering the
funding of the “Economic Recovery Project ” to Burundi, the World
Bank’s management conceded:
Donors are concerned that any budget support, without appropriate
controls, might be misused for military purposes. . . . It is for this
reason that this ERC differs from normal Bank quick disbursing
operations. Foreign exchange will be provided to the private sector,
its distribution and value determined through auction.
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Despite these small, encouraging signs, and the enthusiastic sup-
port the report has gotten from some members of Congress and some
policymakers outside the United States, the thrust of the reaction to
the report from the Treasury Department, the World Bank, the IMF,
and some other members of Congress has been negative. Richard
Gephardt referred to the report as “isolationist.” Pete Stark (who
admitted publicly that he had not read the report) nevertheless char-
acterized our proposals as “laughable.” Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers, testifying before the House Banking Committee faulted
the commission on several specifics and the detailed Treasury “Re-
sponse to the Report of the International Financial Institution Advi-
sory Commission,” released on June 8, reiterated those criticisms.
Given the influence that Secretary Summers’ views may exert on the
reform movement, it is worth addressing some of his criticisms in
detail.3
At the hearings, Summers expressed concern that forgiving too
much of the HIPC debt might hurt the HIPC countries themselves
by making it harder for them to access capital markets in the future.
It is important to stress that our report only spoke to the question of
forgiving the debts owed to the multilaterals. In my view, it would not
be necessary or constructive for the HIPC countries to default on, or
seek forgiveness of, their private sector debt. So long as debt forgive-
ness is confined to the debts of the multilaterals, and the debts held
by individual sovereign creditors, I see no reason why the HIPC
countries would be penalized by the private capital markets. Further-
more, the historical literature on debt default indicates that “war-
ranted” sovereign debt write downs (those which are practically un-
avoidable because of the high cost of debt service relative to available
income) are not penalized very much by future creditors. Because the
HIPC countries clearly fall into the category of warranted debt for-
giveness, I think the secretary’s concerns about the costs they would
bear from debt forgiveness are misplaced.
With respect to our proposals for reforming the IMF, Summers
expressed several concerns. He claims that “few if any of the countries
that have suffered financial crises in recent years . . . would have
qualified for emergency IMF support.” He goes on to recognize that
the commission recommended waiving prequalification standards in
cases where global capital market stability was threatened, and that
therefore, the commission did not, in fact, recommend ruling out
support to any country. Still the secretary questioned, in light of our
recommendation that prequalification could be waived, “how the rest
3All references to statements by Secretary Summers are from Summers (2000).
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of the Report’s proposals in this area are to be interpreted and ap-
plied.” He questioned whether many countries would prequalify for
IMF support, and whether lending even to prequalified countries
would create moral hazard problems (in comparison to the current
practice of attaching “conditionality”).
The secretary’s concerns again are misplaced. First, we envision a
phase-in period of five years for the new prequalification standards,
and we think most emerging market countries would prequalify. Most
or all of the crisis countries in Latin America and Asia would face
strong incentives to meet our proposed standards, particularly since
failing to do so would likely reduce their access to, and raise their
costs of, private finance. If our proposed standards had been imposed,
say, in 1990, the severe crises suffered by these countries (which
largely reflected weaknesses in their banking systems and the incen-
tives of those weak banks to take on enormous exchange rate risks)
may have been averted, and certainly would have been far less severe.
Furthermore, it is hard to see how our proposed IMF lending
arrangements would worsen moral hazard. Moral hazard depends on
the expectation of receiving a subsidy. Under current IMF arrange-
ments, countries borrow large amounts at highly subsidized rates. The
conditionality imposed on these countries (particularly in the area of
financial sector reform) is not enforced and not effective, owing in
part to the short disbursement time period of emergency lending and
the long time period required for meaningful reform. Under our
proposals, there is no subsidy, and therefore, virtually no moral haz-
ard. Prequalifying countries would be able to borrow a limited
amount on a short-term basis in the form of senior debt at a penalty
rate; those that receive emergency assistance without having prequali-
fied must borrow at a super-penalty rate, which provides further
assurance that no subsidies would flow to those borrowers.
Another concern expressed by Summers is that the commission’s
report presumes “that crises emerge almost exclusively from flaws in
the financial sector.” This is a significant misunderstanding of our
report. According to our proposals, the role of the IMF would be to
protect against liquidity problems in the markets for foreign exchange
and sovereign debt that come from problems other than banking
sector fragility. The point of the prequalification standards is to pre-
vent the IMF from being misused as a mechanism for facilitating
financial sector bailouts. Its main function lies elsewhere—
specifically in providing protection against market illiquidity, either
due to information problems that result in the temporary collapse of
markets, or problems of self-fulfilling speculative attacks.
The secretary criticizes our proposals for failing to provide IMF
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support to deal with “balance of payments problems.” I am not sure
what the secretary means by a “balance of payments problem.” Our
proposals for IMF lending are designed to counter balance of pay-
ments outflows resulting from bona fide liquidity crises. Our propos-
als would not channel counter-cyclical subsidies to countries that
suffer balance of payments outlflows, per se. In our view it would be
inappropriate to charge the IMF with the broad mandate of providing
global counter-cyclical fiscal subsidies to its members.
Secretary Summers also criticizes our recommendations for re-
forming the development banks. He objects (1) to limiting emergency
lending to the IMF, (2) to our proposal to target country-level assis-
tance to the poorest countries, and (3) to the use of grants rather than
loans for poverty alleviation.
Our proposal to limit emergency lending to the IMF follows di-
rectly from the principle that separating the functions of the various
multilaterals promotes greater effectiveness and accountability. Un-
der our proposals the IMF would have the capacity to deal with all
bona fide liquidity problems that would arise. There is no need for the
other multilaterals to assist it in providing short-term assistance.
Nevertheless, the Commission Report envisions loans or grants
from development banks to poor countries that have experienced
crisis-induced trauma. We recommend that any assistance to alleviate
poverty or to spur reforms should be channeled through appropriate
long-term programs, and that in the case of reform programs, these
should be designed to ensure that the flow of aid is credibly linked to
the implementation of reforms undertaken by recipients.
The secretary also misunderstands the effect of our proposals on
poor people who reside in developing countries with access to private
capital markets or with per capita annual average incomes higher than
$4,000. He states that “the Report would rule out MDB support for
the majority of the world’s poorest people.” That is not true. While we
recommend that the MDBs focus their country-level poverty allevia-
tion funding on the very poorest countries that lack access to private
capital markets, we would have the World Bank expand its support to
the poor throughout the world through two channels: financial assis-
tance for supplying global public goods, particularly in the areas of
public health and the environment, and technical assistance to all
developing countries. Similarly, the secretary’s statement that “the
Report’s recommendations would drastically undercut the global role
of the World Bank by limiting it to the ‘knowledge’ business” indicates
a serious misunderstanding of our recommendations. We envision a
substantial continuing role for the World Bank in providing financial
assistance.
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Finally, Summers’ statement that “the shift to grant-based funding
would drastically reduce the total amount of official resources that
can be brought to bear in these economies” confuses the dollar
amount of lending that the development banks currently provide with
the dollar amount of assistance implicit in that lending (the amount of
interest subsidy). So long as the development banks retain their capi-
tal (as we recommend), under our proposals they will be able to
channel more assistance using grants than using loan subsidies, and
crowd in a greater flow of credit, to the world’s poorest countries than
they do today. That is so even before taking into account our recom-
mended increases in funding for the development banks. Current
World Bank loans transfer money to borrowing countries in advance
and require borrowing countries to guarantee repayment. Grant
funding frees up additional resources by allowing countries to use
their limited potential to guarantee repayment to support private
market borrowing to finance their share of project costs. Also, unlike
grant subsidies, the amount of subsidy transferred through a loan is
limited by the fact that loans cannot bear an interest rate less than
zero. Taking these advantages of grant-based assistance into account,
Adam Lerrick of the commission staff estimated that a grant-based
program would support a volume of development projects for poverty
alleviation and institutional reform 80 percent larger than that of the
current loan-based programs.
I do not mean to suggest that there is no room for disagreement on
the details of our recommendations. Indeed, it would be remarkable
if that were so. Rather, in reviewing and responding to these argu-
ments I hope to show that the reorganization of these institutions and
the new policy mechanisms we suggest for them (e.g., IMF liquidity
lending with prequalification, grant-based poverty alleviation, cred-
ible subsidization of long-run reforms, and HIPC debt relief) are
quite reasonable and practical economic mechanisms.
Addressing the Foreign Policy Argument
Dealing with these detailed concerns, however, is the easy part of
responding to critics’ objections, and the less important part. Most
critics of our proposals, including the secretary, have a deeper prob-
lem with our report. They do not agree with our goals and principles.
Specifically, many critics do not share the goal of narrowing the lati-
tude of the IMF and the World Bank. To some, the IMF and the
development banks should be used as cost-effective vehicles for “le-
veraging” U.S. foreign policy. From that perspective, any limits on the
“flexibility” of these institutions are undesirable, as is transparency in
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accounting, open voting, independent evaluation of performance, and
other procedural reforms we suggest, since they only get in the way
of flexibility. Indeed, to those who view the multilaterals this way,
their principal advantage is the absence of accountability. Aid can be
delivered, and the embarrassing deals that lie behind it are not easily
traced. Time-consuming parliamentary appropriation debates and
justification for the use of taxpayer funds can be avoided. This point
of view is not often voiced openly, but it is nevertheless a crucial
element in the current debate over reform.
Consider, for example, the recent negotiations between Pakistan
and the IMF. A knowledgeable insider informs me that the U.S.
government has told Pakistan that its access to IMF subsidized lend-
ing depends on its willingness to sign a nuclear nonproliferation
treaty. According to this person, unless Pakistan agrees, the U.S. will
block its IMF program. In this case, the U.S. foreign policy objective
seems laudable, but is the IMF the right tool for achieving it?
The view that the multilaterals should serve the broadly and flexibly
defined goals of U.S. foreign policy is wrong for at least five reasons.
First, the flexibility necessary to permit the multilaterals to serve as
broad foreign policy devices undermines their effectiveness as eco-
nomic mechanisms. When the objectives of poverty reduction and
institutional reform take a back seat to ad hoc foreign policy it is no
surprise that aid mainly flows to the richest and most powerful of the
emerging market countries, or that the IMF and the development
banks maintain so poor a track record, even by the standards of their
own internal evaluations. In my view, there is no more important goal
for American foreign policy than promoting stable economic devel-
opment around the world. We should design multilateral institutions
that are able to meet that challenge. Saddling those institutions with
broader political mandates that weaken their ability to achieve bona
fide economic objectives is counterproductive, even from the per-
spective of foreign policy.
Second, the use of multilaterals to pursue broad foreign policy
objectives forces the management of these institutions to depart from
clear rules and procedures in order to accommodate ad hoc political
motivations. This undermines their integrity as economic institutions,
makes it hard to establish norms for the conduct of management and
mechanisms to ensure their accountability, and leads to erosion of
popular support for funding the important economic goals on which
they should be focused. It is ironic that some of the public officials
who complain loudest about the reluctance of Congress to fund in-
ternational organizations have done more than their share to produce
the cynicism about these organizations that makes them so unpopular.
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The Meltzer Commission recommends substantial increases in the
budgets of effective development banks. But the popular support
necessary to raise new appropriations will not be forthcoming until
these institutions regain their credibility.
Third, the subversion of the process of congressional deliberation
over foreign aid appropriations is no small cost to bear, even in the
interest of pursuing desirable foreign policy objectives. It is beneath
us as a democracy to sanction such behavior. If Congress wishes to
delegate power over a limited amount of resources to a multilateral
“political emergency fund” financed by the G7 countries, then let it
do so openly, establish the appropriate governance and oversight to
accompany that delegation of authority, and keep the management
and funding of that entity separate from the other multilateral insti-
tutions. I am not recommending that such a fund be established, but
rather suggesting that if it were, it should be created by, and be made
accountable to, the governments and taxpayers who authorize and
finance its activities.
Fourth, it is worth considering the adverse impact that loans from
multilateral lenders with noneconomic objectives can have on emerg-
ing market countries. The debt burdens that plague the HIPCs today
are primarily the result of intergovernmental or multilateral loans that
were politically motivated, not private or public lending made to
finance credible investments.
Finally, it may not even be feasible for the United States to con-
tinue to use multilateral financial institutions as an extension of U.S.
foreign policy. Progress in the global economy will make that ap-
proach to those institutions increasingly anachronistic. A decade from
now the global economy will be much more polycentric. Europe and
Japan are likely to enjoy a golden era of productivity growth over the
next decade, as well as substantial improvements in the sophistication
of their financial systems and increases in their living standards. Many
emerging market countries outside of Europe—including Korea, Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Mexico—will soon become full-fledged industrial
nations, as well. Multilateral agencies focused on bona fide economic
objectives, with a more decentralized administrative structure—one
that relies more on regional development banks in Asia and Latin
America, financed by new benefactor countries as well as the G7—
will fit the global economy of the future better than the current
structure, which is rooted in and subservient to the broad goals of
U.S., or G7, foreign policy. And a World Bank that can focus coop-
erative efforts among a growing number of benefactor countries to
address global public health and environmental problems will be
increasingly valuable for the same reason.
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Foreign observers of U.S. Treasury policy—and its reactions to our
report—have already begun to call for an end to American manipu-
lation of the multilaterals. As one observer writes:
What is distasteful about the Summers’ critique of the Meltzer
recommendations is the smell of superpower “diktat” that sur-
rounds them. Essentially Summers is saying that the IFIs serve U.S.
global interests and must be kept in full force, whatever the insta-
bility, corruption and other adverse side-effects their activities may
cause, for that one over-riding reason. He just wants to keep a slush
fund for carrying out U.S. foreign policy. We all know that the U.S.
can get its way by resorting to bullyboy tactics. But it is unpleasant
to be reminded of it [Central Banking 2000: 4].
Sooner or later, global economic progress will mandate the kinds of
reforms our commission is recommending, and a number of senior
members of Congress are considering. It is worth remembering that
the independence of the Federal Reserve System from the Treasury
Department—a precursor of sorts to the economic rationalization of
IMF and World Bank policies advocated by the Meltzer Commis-
sion—that was achieved in 1951 resulted from a shift in economic
power that made it impossible for the Treasury to continue to use
monetary policy as a political and economic tool.
In 1935, then Treasury Secretary Morgenthau gloated that “the
way the Federal Reserve Board is set up now they can suggest but
have very little power to enforce their will. [The Treasury’s] power
has been the Stabilization Fund plus the many other funds that I have
at my disposal and this power has kept the open market committee in
line and afraid of me.” Morgenthau felt no threat from the central-
ization of power at the Board of Governors in 1935 and the new
structure of the Federal Open Market Committee because “I proph-
esy that . . . with the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board
and the five governors of the Federal Reserve Banks forming an open
market committee, that one group will be fighting the other . . . and
that therefore if the financial situation should go sour the chances are
that the public will blame them rather than the Treasury” (Blum
1959: 352). The prospect of retaining power while escaping respon-
sibility always appeals to government officials.
Why was Secretary Morgenthau able to control monetary policy in
the 1930s, and why did that control lapse in the 1950s? In essence,
Morgenthau had more funds at his disposal (with which to expand the
money supply) than the Fed had on its balance sheet (with which to
contract the money supply), so the Fed was simply too small to con-
trol the supply of money. By 1951, however, the size of the Fed had
grown relative to the Treasury’s resources, and its independence,
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codified in the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951, was a forgone conclu-
sion.
The growing strength of other industrial and emerging economies
will increase the independence of the World Bank and the IMF from
U.S. Treasury control in the next decade or two. In the post-World
War II era the U.S. economy reigned supreme. Being an “interna-
tionalist” meant understanding the central importance of the strategic
political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union and
the need to make economic policy subservient to that struggle. But as
the polycentric post-Cold War global polity and economy take hold, it
will become increasingly apparent that the United States neither
should, nor can, use the World Bank and the IMF as a tool of lever-
aged, “stealth” foreign policy.
The Meltzer Commission Report has provided a credible starting
point for reforming the multilateral financial institutions, and has
persuasively argued that it is high time to begin that process. Before
reform can begin, before these institutions can operate as effective
economic mechanisms, they must narrow their focus, regain credibil-
ity as organizations, and recapture the trust of the taxpayers that
finance their operations. And before any of that can happen, the
developed countries, and especially the United States, must resolve
the often unspoken controversy over whether these organizations
should act as foreign policy slush funds or as bona fide economic
institutions. That is the first step toward real reform.
References
Bordo, M.D., and Schwartz, A.J. (1999) “Measuring Real Economic Effects
of Bailouts: Historical Perspectives on How Countries in Financial Dis-
tress Have Fared With and Without Bailouts.” Working Paper. Rutgers
University, November.
BCP’s Molano Latin American Daily (2000) BCP’s Latin American Daily, 15
May.
Blum, J.M. (1959) From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928–1938.
New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Brealey, R.A., and Kaplanis, E. (1999) “The Impact of IMF Assistance on
Asset Values.” Working Paper, Bank of England, September.
Calomiris, C.W., and Meltzer, A.H. (1999) “Fixing the IMF.” The National
Interest 56 (Summer): 88–96.
Central Banking (2000) “How to Reform the Fund: The Meltzer Commis-
sion Points the Way.” Central Banking (May):1.
Edwards, S. (1989) “The International Monetary Fund and the Developing




Feldstein, M. (1998) “Refocusing the IMF.” Foreign Affairs (March/April):
20–33.
Fischer, S. (2000) “Testimony before the International Financial Institution
Advisory Commission.” 2 February.
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (IFIAC) [Allan H.
Meltzer, Chairman] (2000) “Report of the International Financial Institu-
tion Advisory Commission.” March (http://phantom-x.gsia.cmu.edu/
IFIAC).
Polak, J. (1999) “Streamlining the Financial Structure of the International
Monetary Fund.” Princeton: Essays in International Finance 216, Septem-
ber.
Summers, L.H. (2000) “Testimony before the House Banking Committee.”
23 March.
Ul Haque, N., and Khan, M.S. (1999) “Do IMF Supported Programs Work?
A Survey of Cross Country Empirical Evidence.” IMF Working Paper.
November.
U.S. Department of the Treasury (2000) “Response to the Report of the
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission.” 8 June.
Vasquez, I. (2000) “The International Monetary Fund: Challenges and Con-
tradictions.” In International Financial Institution Advisory Commission,
Expert Papers. March (http://phantom-x.gsia.cmu.edu/IFIAC).
World Bank (1998) Assessing Aid. New York: Oxford University Press for the
World Bank
IMF AND WORLD BANK REFORMS
103
